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Summary
This article explores the 28 recommendations posed by the
Turner Review to ensure that the current economic crisis
does not occur again. It sets them within the context of
the debate on economic procyclicality, noting that, in eco-
nomic history, financial crises are the main method of
promulgating financial regulation and, furthermore, that
economic history is shaped by the economic ‘boom and
bust’ of the procyclicality of industry. The Review is lar-
gely criticized by the author because of manner in which
it aims to curb the economic cycle and, in turn, capital-
ism. This paper then explores the FSA Discussion Paper
09/2 which was published on the same day as the Turner
Review and is to be read in conjunction with the Review.
It deals with the ‘Regulatory Response to the Global
Banking Crisis’. Finally the author evaluates reaction to
the Review.
Introduction
Over the last 18 months, the UK, and most of the
world, have been suffering from an economic crisis.
Economic crises are not uncommon, yet this crisis has
caused much furore. Admittedly the crisis, some
would say, is one of the worst in living memory, yet
others reassure society that the crisis will not be as
bad as the American 1929-33 depression.
Within financial/economic crises, regulatory changes
follow in close pursuit and this crisis, in this respect,
is no different. We have seen already the Banking
(Special Provisions) Act 2008, the Banking Act 2009
and now we have a review of the banking industry (the
Turner Review) to decide on what regulation should
be enacted. This is in addition to the Discussion Paper
09/2 issued by the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
on the same say as the Review.
The Turner Review outlines 28 recommendations
and four discussion points. It is a lengthy, verbose and
technically complicated document. The first part of
these joint papers will examine and comment upon
these recommendations. The second part of the paper
will then explore the FSA Discussion paper. It will
analyze the industry’s feelings towards the Review and
Discussion Paper. A pervasive argument throughout
the paper is that in every economic system there are
times of economic boom and economic bust.
The cyclical nature of the economic system is not a
new observation. It is part of the capitalist state. What
the Turner Review recommends is largely to curb this
cycle to ensure there are no extremes of the cycle and
to limit the movement within the economic lifespan.
To do so is straying close to curbing capitalism and
the free economic state.
The Turner Review
The Turner Review (‘the Review’) was published on
18 March 2009. It contains 28 recommendations
within 13 areas. There are also four discussion points
that have been raised for consideration and consulta-
tion. The Review is said to take a long-term approach
and is in no way a means of countering the current
short-term economic crisis. It should be read alongside
the Discussion Paper 09/2 published by the FSA on
the same day. There are four chapters contained in the
Review.
Chapter 1 describes the current economic crisis and
tries to identify why it occurred. This chapter is tech-
nically complex and, at 40 pages long, often misses
crucial elements of the economic crisis. It largely con-
centrates on the statistical factors that can explain the
crisis. To put it simply and condense 40 pages, the
crisis was caused by the evolutionary cycle of the
financial system reaching a point where the only
option was to go down. There are multifaceted and
complex intangibles that add weight to the collapse of
the cycle, causing it to occur in such a dramatic fash-
ion. Banks and bankers are criticized for ignoring
warning signs, and taking large risks to reap the
rewards of large bonuses. The Review steadies itself in
the belief that easy access to credit and mortgages by
low or marginal groups were also to blame. It also
commiserates itself that, although the UK is suffering
an economic crisis, it was largely spurred on by the
collapse of the subprime market in the US. The
knock-on effect caused the crisis. Overall, chapter 1
blames a superfluous number of people and objects. It
forgets that this sophisticated economic system is
rather revolutionary, and in historic terms is still in its
infancy. It ignores the fact that economic systems and
their respective legislation are built on a history of
economic crises and successes. Basically, the Review
ignores the fact that the cycle of economics, the eco-
nomic boom and bust, is organic. It is what happens.
What is recognized is that the highs and lows of the
cycle can never be as high or as low again.
If we look at banking history we see a strong corre-
lation between the growth of industry (within the
Industrial Revolution) and the growth of banks. They
are inter-related. The Industrial Revolution allowed
capitalism to flourish. With capitalism, we see the
growth of society. Without the banking industry being
a explorer into the financial unknown, how can indus-
try grow in the same manner as in the Revolution?
What advances can be made without risk? Does curb-
ing the cycle mean curbing capitalism? Or will a new
type of growth and capitalism emerge from the embers
of this current crisis?
The Review’s recommendations are as follows.
. Capital adequacy, accounting and liquidity
. Institutional and geographic coverage of regulation
. Deposit insurance
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. UK bank resolution
. Credit rating agencies
. Remuneration
. Credit default swap (CDS) market infrastructure
. Macro-prudential analysis
. FSA supervisory approach
. Firm risk management and governance
. Utility banking versus investment banking
. Global cross-border banks
. European cross-border banks
These recommendations deal with aspects of ensur-
ing quality and quantity of capital within the global
banking system. Regulation that is still due to be
enacted (Basel II) should be enacted, so that procyli-
cality does not occur. In other words, regulation
should be through the cycle of economics rather than
at the high and low points of the cycle. Furthermore, a
countercyclical capital adequacy regime should be
imposed and a disciplined backstop should be in place
to stop excessive growth. This curbing of growth and
the flattening off of the cycle of economics is worrying
for the growth of the industrial world and for capital-
ism. Another recommendation, and also the most wor-
rying, is to ensure the regulatory and supervisory
coverage should follow the principle of economic sub-
stance not legal form. In the first area, the recommen-
dations were largely to curb the economic procyclic
cycle, this informs us that economic foundations are
better than legal ones for regulation. Another recom-
mendation is that limits and guarantees for the protec-
tion of retail depositors are put in place, with a further
recommendation to ensure that more consumers are
financially aware of the economic system.
Discussion Paper 09/2
The Discussion Paper (‘the DP’) underpins the
Turner Review. It contains further documentation on
the 28 recommendations posed by the Review. It
reiterates the historical background of the crisis and
the possible causes of it identified in the Review. At
219 pages, it is verbose in the extreme.
The DP puts forward five aims that the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) wishes to achieve. These
are:
1. The global banking system is better capitalized and
more resilient to liquidity shocks throughout the
business cycle;
2. The regulatory framework in general, and its capital
component in particular, are explicitly countercycli-
cal;
3. Supervisory crisis management and resolution
arrangement for cross-border financial service
groups are effective and reflect the interests of host
countries as well as those of the home State;
4. Any material risks to financial stability posed by
unregulated activities or firms are identified and
controlled to the extent possible; and
5. Macro-prudential and other risks to financial stabi-
lity are identified at both the international and
national levels and effective action is taken to miti-
gate them.
The DP does not aim to prompt decisions by regu-
lators but to initiate discussion. It also states the
importance of the role of international regulators in
creating a stable global economic system. The DP
stresses that the overall aim is to create a ‘global bank-
ing system that is sufficiently well capitalized to with-
stand the stresses to which it may become subject to’.
It is suggested that this global regulatory approach
begins closer to home with an EU regulator to oversee
the regulation of the financial systems within the
Member States. Sections 3-13 pose questions to indus-
try relating to the regulatory approach that needs to be
taken.
Overall the DP is clearer, though much lengthier
than the Turner Review. Although the author is of the
opinion that some of the anti-cyclical recommenda-
tions are misplaced, she does acknowledge the need for
reform and change. However, it is her belief that a
knee-jerk reaction and kowtowing to political pressure
is not the answer. The next section in the paper exam-
ines the industry’s response to the Review and the
recommendations contained in the DP.
Industry reaction
After having identified three areas of the likely cause
of the financial crisis – macro-economic imbalance;
financial innovation of little social value and important
deficiencies in key banking capital regulation – the
Review sparked many comments.
Lord Turner states that the recommendations chal-
lenge the underlying intellectual philosophy of regula-
tory and economic approaches. He calls for there to be
not only pan-European cooperation but that this coop-
eration should become a global platform for consensus
in financial matters. He states that the changes are
profound and the emerging economic system will be
unlike any that we have seen before.
One of the major criticisms of the Review is that it
does not recommend the separation of banking func-
tions, i.e., retail and investment. Vince Cable (Liberal
Democrat shadow chancellor) says that the recommen-
dations are little more than a watered down (if ver-
bose) summary of policy changes.
Rob MacGregor (Unite) agrees and states that the
recommendations are more rhetoric than substance.
He, like Cable, acknowledges the need for change but
suggests that Lord Turner has failed to recommend
changes that would actually help the system. Rather,
recommendations have been posed that are detrimental
to the overall mechanisms of the economy and society.
John Cridle, CBI deputy director-general, is pleased
that Lord Turner took this cautious approach and
believes that wide-ranging reforms at this stage are not
the path to follow. He points to the debacle surround-
ing Sarbanes-Oxley as a case in point.1
Richard Saunder (CE Investment Management
Association) states that the recommendation paves the
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way for future reforms and that what is called for is a
return to simple banking.
What is acknowledged by commentators is that the
economic crisis does need attention and reform will
follow, and that the Review sets out a path for future
reform, albeit in a verbose and overly complex way.
However, the regulators are in a difficult position.
Crisis has occurred and history tells us that reform is
required. It is also part of human nature to try to fix
the problem and stop it from happening again. For
regulators, their job is marred by political pressure.
Politicians must be seen to act. We can see this by the
public backlash against many investment bankers. The
FSA, within days of publishing the Review and the
Discussion Paper, published another paper reviewing
the remuneration of financial services employees.
Public pressure, as we can see, affects regulation. This,
on its own, is not a bad thing; in fact it epitomizes
democracy. But finance and economics are complicated
and a knee-jerk reaction to regulation, legislation,
supervision and policy is not best placed, especially in
an economic crisis.
Conclusion
As lawyers and regulators, we can learn a lot from
history. This economic crisis is teaching us lessons
that we can use when creating new regulations and
laws. As lawyers, we are in a privileged position to
know the historical background to the financial ser-
vices regulation and that is has been reaction to eco-
nomic crises in the past. We can also accept that in
economics there are peaks and troughs, highs and
lows, boom and bust. That economics is cyclical is
part of our ideology. However, the Review aims to
flatten the cycle, to ensure that there will not be the
highs and lows that have helped shape out society.
Without the boom in the Industrial Revolution there
would not have been a Revolution. What is of con-
cern is that if we adopt these safety measures and
allow the cycle to be flattened, what other positive
possibilities could we as a society miss out on. Life is
about ups and downs, what matters is how we cope
with them.
Financial Markets and Regulation
Business Law Review July 2009160
